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The federal income tax exclusion for personal injury awards in In-
ternal Revenue Code' section 104(a)(2) has generated a fair amount of
high-powered litigation during the past several years.2 In fact, this old
and relatively short Code provision eventually attracted the interest of the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1992, 1995, and 1996 in United States v. Burke,3
Commissioner v. Schleier," and O'Gilvie v. United States,5 respectively.
Congress finally got into the act by amending the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.6 Under prior
law, the exclusion extended to any compensatory damages received on
account of personal injuries or sickness.7 The amendment limits the ex-
clusion to any compensatory damages received on account of personal
physical injuries or physical sickness.!
Prior to Burke, Schleier, and the 1996 amendment, lower courts
were extending the scope of the exclusion to the point where practically
* Professor of Law at Chapman University School of Law in Anaheim, California. B.S.,
1966, University of Illinois; C.P.A., 1966, Illinois; J.D., 1969, Chicago-Kent (cum laude). Professor
Doti is admitted to practice in California, Colorado, and Illinois and is certified as a tax law
specialist by the California Board of Legal Specialization. Professor Doti acknowledges his students,
Brad Etter and George Willis, for their research assistance on this work.
1. All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996).
3. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
4. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
5. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39 § 1605(a) (1996). Congress attempted to
amend Code § 104(a)(2) in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995 in section 13611. H.R. 2491,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). President Clinton vetoed the 1995 Act. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (vetoed).
7. Confusion with respect to the taxability of punitive damages prior to the 1996 amendment
of Code § 104(a)(2) was settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct.
452 (1996). The Court held that punitive damages are not excludable under section 104(a)(2). For
pre-O'Gilvie contrary positions see Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32; Miller v. Commissioner, 93
T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th
Cir. 1983).
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996).
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all personal tort or tort-like recoveries were held to be excludable
Starting with the Ninth Circuit's liberal decision in 1983 in Roemer v.
Commissioner" and the Tax Court's acquiescence in 1986 in Threlkeld v.
.Commissioner," the personal injury exclusion was expanded from tradi-
tional torts like libel and slander to statutorily created causes of action in
various employment discrimination laws of the federal and state gov-
ernments. 2
I have two purposes to serve with this work. First, I believe that
most of the confusion and controversy surrounding the personal injury
exclusion would have been avoided if Congress had carefully considered
the scope of the exclusion from its inception.'3 In my opinion, the exclu-
sion should apply only to personal injury damages attributable to lost
human capital and not lost wages and earning power. Allowing tax-free
treatment for lost wages and earning power for the victim of a physical
injury tort (such as an automobile accident) has caused confusion re-
garding the scope of the exclusion." Unlike other scholars who believe
that Congress went too far in restricting the exclusion in the 1996 Act,'5 I
believe that Congress did not go far enough. Congress should have
eliminated the section 104(a)(2) exclusion for lost wages and earning
power in all cases. Furthermore, the 1996 amendment has not cleared up
the confusion over the exclusion. Uncertainty and resulting litigation will
continue until Congress limits the exclusion to damages attributable
solely to losses of human capital.
Second, the new legislation raises a notable issue: What is meant by
physical injuries or physical sickness? Although amended section
104(a)(2) specifically provides that "emotional distress shall not be
treated as a physical injury or physical sickness,"'6 there still are many
uncertainties over the meaning of these terms. Since Congress did not
9. See Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (excluding
damages for age discrimination); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3rd Cir. 1990) (excluding
damages for age discrimination); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (excluding
damages for age discrimination); Byme v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1989) (excluding
damages for wrongful discharge); Bent v. Commisioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987) (excluding
damages for violation of the right to free speech).
10. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), afftd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
12. These laws include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1994); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
13. For a similar view, see Robert Cate lllig, Note, Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An
Opportunity to Narrow the Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1459, 1481 (1995).
14. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
15. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury
Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 168 (1997) (arguing that the
amended exclusion is insupportable from the standpoint of tax policy and problematic in terms of
administrability).
16. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
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define them, I provide some guidance for practitioners and the Treasury
Department with respect to regulations to be issued under section
104(a)(2).
I begin with an analysis of the human capital theory of the exclusion
in Part II. Part III explains how the pre-amended 1996 personal injury
exclusion in section 104(a)(2) generated considerable confusion and
controversy. Part IV deals with the 1996 Act and the meaning of physical
injury and physical sickness. I conclude with a proposal to Congress to
adopt the human capital theory to make the exclusion more equitable and
to avoid confusion and controversy about the meaning of physical injury
and physical sickness.
II. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
From its inception, in my opinion, the exclusion for personal injury
awards should have been limited to losses of human capital. By this I
mean any losses to a person's birthright-an uninjured body and mind.
So far the Internal Revenue Service has not treated an individual's birth
as an accession to wealth under the broad definition of income enunci-
ated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. 7 Besides being ludicrous, taxing an individual at birth would resem-
ble a capitation or head tax that would have to be apportioned under the
Constitution.'8 After birth, of course, persons are subject to federal in-
come tax on any "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."'9
The victim of an automobile accident may receive damages from
the tortfeasor to compensate for medical bills, pain and suffering, and
lost wages.' Under the birthright concept of human capital, the reim-
bursement of medical bills and pain and suffering is not income, because
the victim is compensated for losses to his/her birthright-an uninjured
body and mind. The tortfeasor injured the victim's body and mind, and
the reimbursement of medical costs and pain and suffering compensates
for such losses. There is no gain, since money damages are intended to
put the victim back in the same position as before the accident.'
17. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which provides: "No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration before directed to be taken." In Fernandez v.
Wiener, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress may tax real estate or chattels only if the tax is
apportioned. 326 U.S. 340, 345 (1945).
19. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431 n.15.
20. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(5th ed. 1984).
21. For a discussion of the definition of income that is broad enough to encompass most
damage awards, see Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 43, 45 (1987), and Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
143, 151 (1992).
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The payment of lost wages, however, compensates for a loss of
earnings that would have been received from working but for the acci-
dent. This is an accretion to wealth and would clearly be income had the
victim not been injured. The victim has realized a financial gain that was
not part of his human capital (body and mind) at birth.22
Under the human capital theory, any damages received on account
of injuries to body and mind should be excludable under the Code. Thus,
even damages for emotional distress should be excludable, since the vic-
tim's nervous system (mind) has been adversely affected. On the other
hand, any damages for lost wages or earning power should be taxable in
all cases, even in the automobile accident scenario.
The human capital or birthright concept should also extend to dam-
ages received on account of an individual's harmed reputation in cases of
defamation and other dignitary torts. Perhaps not as obvious as damages
to body and mind, the victim's untainted reputation in the community is
no less a birthright than an uninjured body and mind. On the other hand,
reimbursement of lost profits in a business or profession is not replace-
ment of lost capital, it is a replacement of lost income due to the de-
famatory remarks. The courts have struggled with the application of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) to defamation, particularly in the case of business and pro-
fessional reputation.' In my opinion, adoption of the human capital the-
ory would have resulted in much less litigation and the inconsistencies
resulting therefrom.
In many tort settlements and judgements there is an award of a
lump-sum amount without any breakdown of the specific damages." Ob-
viously this creates an allocation problem, and much of the litigation
under section 104(a)(2) is attributable to the Internal Revenue Service's
frustrations with lump-sum settlements.' Since victims have the burden
of proving the excludable portion of any settlement.' there would be a
strong incentive to break down the settlement into its component parts
22. For other views of the human capital theory see Steven Jay Stewart, Note, Damage Award
Taxation Under Section 104(a)(2) of the J.R.C.-Congress Clarifies Application of the Schleier Test,
47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1255 (1997), and Paul B. Stephan Ell, Federal Income Taxation and Human
Capital, 70 VA. L. REv. 1357 (1984).
23. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that damages
awarded in a defamation suit were excludable from gross income); Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.
1104 (1983) (stating that compensatory damages are excludable from gross income calculations);
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1986) (holding that "there is no justification for
continuing to draw a distinction, in tort actions, between damages received for injury to personal
reputation and damages received for injury to professional reputation").
24. See supra note 20.
25. See Barnes v. Commissioner, No. 21856-95, 1997 WL 12138 (U.S. Tax Ct. Jan. 15, 1997);
McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465 (1994); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994),
affd, 70 F.3d 34 (1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150,
161(1991); Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 17 (1992).
26. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996); Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32
(1972).
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under the birthright view. To avoid unrealistic allocations, the Internal
Revenue Service can apply the arm's length (substance over form) stan-
dards that it applies in other areas of the federal income tax law."
Taxpayers should find it easier to comprehend the birthright view
than the current personal injury exclusion in section 104(a)(2). They
surely can appreciate an exclusion for damages to body, mind, and repu-
tation, but would understand why lost wages and earning power are tax-
able. Because lost wages and earning power would always be subject to
income tax, Congress could amend related Code provisions to treat the
reimbursement of lost wages and earning power as earned income." Then
these damages could qualify for the various tax benefits of earned in-
come, including social security qualification and benefits and tax-favored
employee and self-employed benefit plans. 9 On the government's side,
treating lost wages and earning power as taxable earned income would
increase not only the revenues collected from income taxes, but also
revenues from social security, Medicare, and self-employment taxes.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Early History
It appears that all branches of the federal government have been
confused about the scope of the personal injury exclusion from its incep-
tion. The misunderstanding seems to have started with an opinion of the
U.S. Attorney General addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury in
1918. ° The issue was the taxability of accident insurance policy pro-
ceeds.' At the time, the income tax statute did not contain an exclusion
for personal injury awards. 2 The Attorney General advised that "the pro-
ceeds of an accident insurance policy received by an individual on ac-
count of personal injuries sustained by him through accident are not in-
come taxable."33 The rationale was that accident insurance proceeds took
the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the acci-
27. See I.R.C. § 482 (1997) (allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers) and I.R.C.
§ 267 (1997) (losses, etc. between related taxpayers).
28. For instance, I.R.C. § 3121(b) (1997), which contains the definition of income for social
security purposes, and I.R.C. § 1402(b) (1997), which contains the definition of self-employment
income. A problem arises, if the tortfeasor is not an employer, with respect to the employer's share
of social security (FICA) tax liability under I.R.C. § 3111 (1997) and unemployment tax under
I.R.C. § 3301 (1997). A possible solution is to exempt the lost wages portion of a personal injury
settlement from these employer taxes.
29. See Brick N. Murphy & Dan L. Dodge, The Small Business Job Protection Act: Taxability
and Withholding on Damages, Wis. LAW., Dec. 1996, at 20, 23 (concluding that a critical issue not
addressed by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 is under what circumstances employers
must withhold income, FICA, and Medicare taxes from settlement amounts and awards of damages).
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dent." Unfortunately, the Attorney General did not distinguish between
losses to the accident victim attributable to bodily injuries and losses of
future income from wages and earning power. 5
Following the lead of the Attorney General in his opinion letter, the
Treasury Department held shortly thereafter that "an amount received by
an individual as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries
sustained by him through accident is not income."'6 Congress then effec-
tively codified these positions in 1918 in the first version of a statutory
personal injury exclusion." That provision excluded from income
"amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under work-
men's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sick-
ness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or
agreement on account of such injuries or sickness." '
B. O'Gilvie v. United States
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court had the occasion to determine the
scope of this original personal injury exclusion statute in O'Gilvie v.
United States.39 At issue was the taxability of punitive damages received
in a personal injury case prior to the 1996 amendments to section
104(a)(2). ' The Court held that punitive damages are taxable because
they are not received "on account of personal injuries." Instead, punitive
damages are generally intended to punish the tortfeasor. '2 Justice Breyer,
who delivered the majority opinion, analyzed the 1918 exclusionary pro-
vision and made the following significant comments:
We concede that the original provision's language does go beyond
what one might expect a purely tax-policy-related "human capital"
rationale to justify. That is because the language excludes from taxa-
tion not only those damages that aim to substitute for a victim's
physical or personal well-being-personal assets that the Government
does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not lost them. It
also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for
lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned them.
To that extent, the provision can make the compensated taxpayer
34. Id. at 308.
35. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918). The Attorney General Opinion does not specifically address
the receipt of accident insurance proceeds to compensate for lost wages and earning power. Id.
Normally accident insurance is intended to cover various losses suffered by the insured including
lost income and earning power. JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSuRANcE LAW AND PRAncIE § 24
(1981). Thus, the Treasury Department may have interpreted the Attorney General Opinion broadly
to exclude lost wages and earning power in connection with an accident.
36. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
37. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 455 (1996).
38. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066.
39. 117 S. Ct. 452.
40. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 457.
41. Id. at 454.
42. Id. at 455.
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better off from a tax perspective than had the personal injury not
taken place. 3
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the 1918 personal injury
statute went beyond what might have been expected from Congress in an
exclusionary provision. It excludes even lost wages, and thus puts the
victim in a better income tax position than she would be if she had not
suffered the personal injury. In my opinion, the Court is chiding Con-
gress for not having limited the exclusion to human capital losses. It
seems the Court would prefer that the personal injury exclusion be lim-
ited to losses to a victim's birthright ("physical or personal well-being")
along the lines that I have suggested.
Congress did not carefully consider how extensive it wanted the
personal injury exclusion to be in 1918. The legislative history adds little
insight other than stating that "[u]nder the present law it is doubtful
whether amounts received through accident or health insurance, or under
workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or
sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness,
are required to be included in gross income." This language suggests
that Congress was merely adopting the Attorney General's opinion with
respect to accident insurance. '5 It is ironic that the original personal injury
exclusion was worded so broadly, since Congress could have simply
limited the exclusion to nontaxable losses of human capital.
Of course we have the benefit of hindsight. The federal income tax
was relatively new in 19 18 .' Also, the Supreme Court's extension of the
definition of income did not come until 1955 in Glenshaw Glass.' For
many years before Glenshaw Glass,' the courts and Treasury Depart-
ment thought that the concept of income was limited to gains derived
from labor and capital under the rationale of Eisner v. Macomber.9 Since
the victim of a tort does not use labor or capital to produce the damage
award, all of the proceeds would have been excludable under the old and
now out-of-favor Eisner v. Macomber rationale. Glenshaw Glass ex-
tended the concept of income to any increase in a person's wealth re-
gardless of its source.- So perhaps it is wrong to blame only the Attorney
General for all the confusion that has existed with respect to the personal
injury exclusion.
43. Id. at 456.
44. H.R. REP. No. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 86, 92.
45. Id.
46. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 494-97 (1973) (discussing
the history of federal taxation including the origination of the federal income tax in 1862).
47. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
48. Id.
49. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1929).
50. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 476.
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C. United States v. Burke
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court had its first occasion to examine
the section 104(a)(2) exclusion in United States v. Burke.' The majority
held that damages received for gender discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not excludable under section 104(a)(2)."
The Court found that Title VII at that time was not a tort or tort-like
cause of action because the remedies thereunder were limited to back
pay, injunctions, and other equitable relief." Title VII, prior to its
amendment in 1991, did not provide the traditional tort remedies for pain
and suffering, emotional distress, and harm to reputation.? Thus, ac-
cording to the majority, the taxpayer's cause of action failed the litmus
test for a tort or tort-like claim."
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion that seems to embrace the
birthright theory of the personal injury exclusion. Scalia admitted that the
term "personal injury" was susceptible to the broad interpretation given
by the majority.' Nevertheless, he concluded that a more literal interpre-
tation would encompass only physical and mental injuries." Scalia noted
that the phrase "personal injury or sickness" is used in several other parts
of Code section 104 in the context of physical and mental health.58 There-
fore, Scalia believed the phrase in section 104(a)(2) should be similarly
limited to damages to physical and mental health, but damages received
in the form of back pay should be taxable. 9
I agree in concept with Justice Scalia's view that the personal injury
exclusion should be limited to physical and mental injuries. Effectively it
coincides with the human capital or birthright theory, which limits the
personal injury exclusion. Since Congress wrote the 1918 and subsequent
personal injury exclusionary provisions rather broadly, however, I do not
agree with Scalia that section 104(a)(2) was so limited at that time. ° The
majority view as expressed in O'Gilvie6' seems to be the better interpre-
tation of section 104(a)(2) prior to the 1996 amendments. As noted
51. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
52. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
53. Id. at 241.
54. Id. at 239.
55. Id. at 240.
56. Id. at 243.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 245.
60. Before its amendment in 1996, Code § 104(a)(2) provided as follows: "gross income does
not include-(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as period payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(2) (1994). The use of the term "any" damages and the fact that no reference is made to
requiring physical injuries for exclusion suggests a broader interpretation of § 104(a)(2) as it existed
prior to amendment.
61. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
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above, the Court in O'Gilvie believes that the section 104(a)(2) exclusion
61extends to lost wages.
D. Commissioner v. Schleier
The frustrations of the judiciary with section 104(a)(2) reached its
zenith when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Schleier
in 1995.63 The issue in Schleier was whether an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) recovery of back-pay and an equal amount of
liquidated damages was excludable under section 104(a)(2)." The tax-
payer, Erich Schleier, was a pilot for United Airlines who was terminated
when he reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty.65 The ADEA
provided for recovery of back-pay and an equal amount as liquidated
damages if the employer acted wilfully in terminating an employee due
to age.' The Supreme Court held that the entire recovery was taxable.
First, the Court found that an action under ADEA is not a tort or tort-like
cause of action.67 Because ADEA allowed only recovery of back wages
and an equal amount of liquidated damages when the employer's conduct
is willful, the majority of the Court found that these remedies were not
sufficient to treat an ADEA violation as a tort.6 As the liquidated dam-
ages were punitive in nature, the majority felt that the only compensatory
damages available under ADEA are back wages.'
The Court could have stopped there. Because the damages must be
received "on account of' personal injury or sickness, however, the ma-
jority felt compelled to add a second prong to the test for exclusion that
requires a link between the cause of action and the damages recovered.'
This new test created a great deal of confusion about the scope of the
section 104(a)(2) exclusion.7' Many believe the Supreme Court's new test
in Schleier effectively made recoveries of back wages taxable, unless the
injured party suffered physical injury as a result of the tortfeasor's con-
duct." If that is true, employment discrimination and other dignitary tort
awards of back wages would nearly always be taxable, because the vic-
tim usually does not suffer any physical injuries or sickness other than
62. Id. at 455.
63. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 326.
67. Id. at 336.
68. Id. at 330.
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. at 337.
71. See Frank J. Doti & Peter J. Rimel, Does the U.S. Supreme Court's Schleier Decision
Limit the Personal Injury Exclusion to Physical Injuries?, CAL. TAX LAW., Spring 1996, at 46; see
also Robert M. Elwood, Supreme Court Ruling on Taxation of Discrimination Damages Provides
Little Resolution, 83 J. TAx'N 148 (1995) (discussing continuing ambiguities and problems left
unresolved by the Schleier court).
72. See supra note 71.
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emotional distress. The majority noted that Mr. Schleier might have suf-
fered emotional distress as a result of his firing.73 This intangible injury,
however, was not sufficient to link the tortious conduct of his employer
with the award of back pay."
In my opinion, the Court was troubled by the fact that one-half of
the award was to compensate Mr. Schleier for lost wages and the other
half was to punish the employer and was determined by reference to the
amount of back wages to which Mr. Schleier was entitled. Therefore, all
the damages were based upon lost income with no compensation for pain
and suffering attributable to emotional distress. Although the majority
opinion makes no reference to the human capital theory, I believe that
the Court was concerned with opening the door to tax-free treatment of
employment discrimination recoveries. Since employment discrimination
recoveries are so heavily weighted with lost wages, 75 it seems that the
Court could not accept the fact that Congress intended such a loophole to
exist for lost wages-a classic form of taxable income.
E. Recent U.S. Tax Court Decisions
The U.S. Tax Court has applied the Schleier tests in two recent
cases that predate the application of the 1996 amendments of section
104(a)(2). In Barnes v. Commissioner, the petitioner worked as a book-
keeper for the National Livestock Commission Association (NLCA).6
After she was served with a subpoena to give a deposition in an lawsuit
involving the NLCA, she was fired. ' As a result of the termination, peti-
tioner suffered embarrassment, humiliation, and other mental distress.
8
Petitioner also claimed that the mental distress manifested itself in the
appearance of precancerous tumors which were being monitored by her
doctor." She filed a wrongful termination action and eventually settled
with the NLCA for $27,000.' Although the petitioner signed a general
release of all claims, there was no allocation of the settlement award
between the specific claims that she had alleged.8'
73. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
74. Id. at 330 n.4.
75. See Grimes v. District of Columbia, 836 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Coming Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974)
76. Barnes v. Commissioner, No. 21856-95, 1997 WL 12138, at *1 (U.S. Tax CL Jan. 15,
1997). This case was decided by a special trial judge under the small claims procedures of I.R.C. §
7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Curiously, the judge in Barnes did not make any reference to the precancerous tumors
suffered by the plaintiff in his opinion, other than in the recitation of facts. Id. Thus, it is difficult to
draw any inference between the significance of this possible physical injury and the judge's decision
that the mental distress damages were excludable.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *4.
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A special trial judge for the Tax Court examined Oklahoma law to
determine if the first prong in Schleier was satisfied.'2 The judge found
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that a wrongful termination
cause of action was founded in tort." Thus, the requirement that the cause
of action be tort or tort-like was satisfied. With regard to the second
prong in Schleier, the court determined whether the damages were re-
ceived "on account of personal injury or sickness. ''" Since there was no
allocation of the damages, the court examined the surrounding facts and
circumstances and, in particular, the testimony of the petitioner's attor-
ney in the wrongful termination action and settlement." The judge de-
cided: "Based upon our examination of the record and upon due consid-
eration, we allocate $13,500 to the mental distress claim and $13,500 to
the punitive damages claim...."
The judge interpreted Schleier liberally and permitted the exclusion
of damages received for intangible harms such as mental distress where
the state law governing the cause of action provides for such damages.'
Thus, the amount allocated to mental distress was held to be excludable,
whereas the portion allocated for punitive damages was taxable under
O'Gilvie.' It is significant that the court did not require the taxpayer-
petitioner to have suffered any physical injury or physical sickness when
the tort was committed. Consequently, this court views the second prong
of Schleier as not requiring physical injury or physical sickness at the
time the tort was committed. Presumably the court would have ruled
differently with respect to the damages for mental distress, if amended
section 104(a)(2) applied to this case. '
A similar result was reached in Knevelbaard v. Commissioner.' The
Tax Court held that damages awarded in an action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress were excludable under section 104(a)(2) as it is
read prior to the 1996 amendments.9' The petitioner claimed that he suf-
fered mental stress after a bank engaged in fraudulent business practices
and made risky loans to one of the petitioner's debtors, which resulted in
significant financial losses to the petitioner.' Despite his stress, the peti-
tioner did not seek any professional mental health assistance." As in
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id.
89. See discussion infra Part IV with respect to the amended Code § 104(a)(2) requirement
that the damages be received on account of physical injury or physical sickness.
90. No. 21366-94, 1997 WL 405191 (U.S. Tax Ct. July 21, 1997).
91. Knevelbaard, 1997 WL405191,at*l.
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *3.
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Barnes, the damages were measured by the petitioner's lost income." Yet
the court held that the damages were excludable as a personal injury
award under section 104(a)(2)."
These very recent Tax Court decisions illustrate the conflicting sig-
nals that taxpayers faced in light of Schleier. Because of Schleier, Con-
gress finally recognized the inconsistencies in the application of section
104(a)(2), especially with respect to employment discrimination
awards. ' I believe the confusion and controversy would have been
avoided if Congress had originally adopted the human capital theory of
the exclusion.
IV. 1996 ACT & PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT
A. Background
In 1995, Congress attempted to narrow the scope of Code section
104(a)(2) in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995, which President
Clinton chose to veto.97 In 1996, the amendments to section 104(a)(2)
became law as part of the Small Business Job Protection Act.98 The
amendment and legislative history are substantially the same as that in
the 1995 Act.'
The new law applies to amounts received after August 20, 1996 (the
date of enactment), in taxable years ending after such date.'" Under a
transition rule, the amendments do not apply to amounts received under a
written binding agreement, court order, or mediation award in effect (or
issued on or before) on September 13, 1995.'0' Thus, Congress adopted a
transition rule date that is nearly one year earlier than enactment, instead
of one closer to enactment as is typical, presumably because of its action
regarding the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995. Although that 1995
Act did not become law, Congress apparently felt taxpayers had notice
about its intention to narrow the scope of section 104(a)(2).
As amended, section 104(a)(2) provides that gross income does not
include:
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) re-
ceived... on account of personal physical injuries or physical sick-
ness .... For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not
be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at "12.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
97. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (vetoed).
98. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1836-39 § 1605(a) (1996).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-280 (11) (1995).
100. Id. § 1605(d).
101. Id.
[Vol. 75:1
PERSONAL INJURY INCOME TAX EXCLUSION
sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the
amount paid for medical care (described in subparagraph (A) or (B)
of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional distress.'
The amendment and legislative history are clear with respect to pu-
nitive damages received after August 20, 1997.03 Punitive damages are
taxable whether or not related to a physical injury or physical sickness.'
The only exception is for punitive damages received in a wrongful death
action, if the applicable state law (as in effect on September 13, 1995
without regard to subsequent modification) provides that only punitive
damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action. 5
B. Legislative History
With respect to compensatory damages, the House Conference Re-
port contains an explanation of the requirement of physical injury or
physical sickness that may not be gleaned from the statutory language.'
Since the House version of the bill was adopted in conference, the fol-
lowing conference report statements are helpful in understanding part of
the meaning of physical injury or physical sickness: 
The House bill provides that the exclusion from gross income applies
to damages on account of a personal physical injury or physical sick-
ness. If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sick-
ness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow there-
from are treated as payments received on account of physical injury
or physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the
injured party. For example, damages (other than punitive damages)
received by an individual on account of a claim for loss of consortium
due to the physical injury or physical sickness of such individual's
spouse are excludable from gross income. In addition, damages (other
than punitive damages) received on account of a claim of wrongful
death continue to be excludable from taxable income under present
law.
The House bill also specifically provides that emotional distress is not
considered a physical injury or physical sickness. Thus, the exclusion
from gross income does not apply to any damages received (other
than for medical expenses as discussed below) based on a claim of
employment discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied by a
claim of emotional distress. Because all damages received on account
of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross in-
come, the exclusion from gross income applies to any damages re-
102. 42 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996).
103. For the law regarding punitive damages prior to the 1996 amendments, see supra note 7.
104. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 1996 H.R. 3448, 110 Stat. 17455, 1838.
105. Id. Alabama's wrongful death statute is a good example of such a state law. See ALA.
CODE §§ 6-5-391 to -410 (1975).
106. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996).
107. Id.
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ceived on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physi-
cal injury or physical sickness. In addition, the exclusion from gross
income specifically applies to the amount of damages received that is
not in excess of the amount paid for medical care attributable to emo-
tional distress.... log
The conference report explains Congress' intent with regard to some
aspects of the physical injury or physical sickness requirement that must
be met before compensatory damages are excludable. As the following
hypotheticals illustrate, however, there are many issue& that are not re-
solved by the Code and conference report.
C. Hypotheticals
For example, examine the situation of the victim of an automobile
accident (caused by a tortfeasor) who suffers lacerations and broken
bones and is unable to work. She recovers damages which reimburse her
for medical costs, pain and suffering, and lost wages from her job.
All of the damages are excludable because she suffered a physical
injury as a result of the negligence of the tortfeasor. Since her cause of
action had its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, all com-
pensatory damages that flow therefrom (including the lost wages) are
treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness, and are thus excludable.
If the accident victim in the example also suffers emotional distress
as a result of the accident, then any damages received on account thereof
are also excludable. This is due to the fact that the emotional distress is
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness. Thus any damages
received for emotional distress caused by the victim being upset about
her bodily injuries or her inability to work would be excludable. This
seems clear under the above conference report, although the statute does
not specifically so provide.
When we look at the victim of defamation or employment discrimi-
nation, any damages awarded to the victim are normally taxable. This is
because the victims of defamation and employment discrimination nor-
mally do not suffer physical injury or physical sickness. Although the
victim usually suffers emotional distress, it is clear under the conference
report that any damages (including emotional pain and suffering and lost
wages) are taxable. The only exception is for costs incurred for medical
care attributable to emotional distress. Thus, if the victim of a dignitary
tort pays a psychiatrist for consultation on her emotional problems attrib-
utable to the tortfeasor's conduct, reimbursement of the doctor's fees are
excludable."
108. Id. at 301.
109. Id. at 301.
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With respect to wrongful death actions, any damages received by
loved ones from the tortfeasor are excludable even though the plaintiffs
did not suffer physical injury or physical sickness. Although the statute
does not specifically cover wrongful death actions, the conference report
makes clear that the plaintiff effectively steps into the shoes of the victim
of the wrongful death.
Problems will certainly arise on what constitutes a physical injury or
physical sickness. Neither the Code nor legislative history defines physi-
cal injury or physical sickness, except to tax recoveries for emotional
distress not accompanied by physical injury or physical sickness caused
initially by the tortfeasor.
In a footnote to the conference report, the conferees state: "The
Committee intends that the term emotional distress includes physical
symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders) which may
result from such emotional distress.""' Thus it is clear that rather typical
and benign physical symptoms of emotional distress of the types listed
will not transform the emotional distress into physical injury or physical
sickness. It is not clear, however, whether more serious physical mani-
festations of emotional distress, such as a nervous breakdown or heart
attack, will constitute physical injury or physical sickness.
For example, take the situation of the victim of defamation or em-
ployment discrimination who has severe emotional distress that ulti-
mately manifests itself in a mental breakdown. Most medical practitio-
ners consider a mental breakdown to be physical injury or physical sick-
ness."' The problem, however, is that defamation or employment dis-
crimination does not normally have its origin in a physical injury or
physical sickness. The conference report is not clear on whether the vic-
tim of a dignitary tort is required to suffer a physical injury or physical
sickness contemporaneous with the time the tort was committed. The
conference report states: "If an action has its origin in a physical injury
or physical sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that
flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account of physical
injury or physical sickness....
The issue becomes whether the dignitary tort had its origin in the
mental breakdown. An argument, no doubt, could be made that the bod-
ily processes that ultimately manifested themselves in a mental break-
down started at the time the dignitary tort was committed. The confer-
ence report does go on to provide, however, that the exclusion extends
only to the amount paid for medical care attributable to emotional dis-
110. Id.at301.
I 11. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 621 A.2d 872, 887 (Md. 1993); Vanoni v.
Western Airline, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); Smith, Relationship of Emotional Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Physic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
112. H.R. REp. No. 65-767, at 301 (1996).
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tress."3 If the conferees meant this language to apply to the mental break-
down scenario, then the exclusion would be limited to doctor and other
medical costs. On the other hand, the conferees' statement with respect
to medical care may be referring to psychiatric care for purely emotional
distress not accompanied by physical injury or physical sickness, such as
a mental breakdown. This ambiguity in Congressional intent will proba-
bly not be resolved until the issue is litigated.
Another issue is how serious the physical injury or physical sickness
has to be. For example, a tortfeasor spits on a victim who then suffers
emotional distress. Or the victim of sexual harassment at work endures
unwanted fondling by her superior. Have these victims suffered physical
injury or physical sickness? Stated directly, does mere touching of the
human body constitute a physical injury or physical sickness? The Code
and legislative history are silent on how extensive the physical injury or
physical sickness has to be such that it is covered by the section
104(a)(2) exclusion.
Or take a different kind of involvement of the human body. A pa-
tron of a fancy restaurant ingests rat feces as part of his Beef Wellington
entree. He suffers emotional distress from the unwanted ingredient, but
no apparent bodily injury or sickness. Has he suffered a physical injury
merely because the restaurant caused an unwanted substance to enter his
body? Again, the extent of involvement of one's body under the new law
for purposes of exclusion is an unanswered issue.
Black's Law Dictionary defines physical injury as: "Bodily harm or
hurt, excluding mental distress, fright, or emotional disturbance.""" The
spitting, fondling, and rat feces in the above examples do not normally
result in bodily harm or hurt in the literal sense. In fact, these distur-
bances usually result in only mental distress, fright, or emotional distur-
bance. Nevertheless, in our examples, an argument could be made that
the body was adversely affected and thus harmed or hurt, although to a
lesser degree than when the victim suffers cuts and bruises and more
obvious bodily injury.
D. Comparison to Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In tort law there is a common law rule that physical injury or physi-
cal impact is a prerequisite to the recovery of damages for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress."' Although the trend is for jurisdictions to
113. Id.
114. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 1147 (6thed. 1990).
115. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 361 (5th ed.
1984). For the U.S. Supreme Court's application of the common law rule in a case arising under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532
(1994); Logan v. Saint Luke's Gen. Hosp., 400 P.2d 296 (Wis. 1965); Weissman v. Wells, 267 S.W.
400 (Mo. 1924); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 436A.
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reject the physical injury/physical impact requirement, the ebbing major-
ity view is to adhere to the traditional rule requiring some form of physi-
cal injury or physical impact to recover under negligent infliction of
emotional distress."' It seems unlikely that Congress had in mind this
majority rule of tort law when it amended section 104(a)(2), and the leg-
islative history is silent on the issue.
Florida's application of the physical injury/physical impact re-
quirement in cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress is repre-
sentative of the majority view."7 At common law, the physical in-
jury/physical impact rule barred recovery for purely psychological inju-
ries."8 A plaintiff could only recover damages for emotional distress
which flowed from physical injuries caused by a tortfeasor's
negligence.' The common law rule is based on judges' skepticism about
the reliability of evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental state and the
possibility that plaintiffs may be faking emotional distress.' Because it
is usually harder to fake physical injuries, the physical injury/physical
impact requirement was interposed in an attempt to avoid the problem of
proof of injury.''
Congress may have the same concerns that judges have had with
respect to emotional distress that is not attributable to physical injury or
physical sickness.'22 Hence, Congress imposed the requirement of physi-
cal injury or physical sickness for the personal injury exclusion to apply.
Furthermore, in its conference report, Congress allows tax-free treatment
for emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical
sickness.'23 Coincidentally, Congress' view mirrors the common law rule
that allows damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if
the emotional distress is attributable to physical injury.
Interestingly, the common law physical injury/physical impact rule
of negligent infliction of emotional distress has an exception.'"" Recovery
is possible for emotional distress attributable to defamation.'" The con-
ference report, however, provides that the exclusion does not apply to
116. See Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement
in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, TORT & INS. L.J., Fall
1992, at 1.
117. See Ira H. Leesfield, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Where Are We Now?,
FLA. Bus. J., Feb. 1997, at 42.
118. See supra note 115.
119. Id.
120. See Marrs, supra note 116, at 43.
121. Id.
122. H.R. REP. No. 1104-737 (1996) is silent on the issue of Congress' concern with regard to
proof of emotional distress.
123. Id.
124. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1953) (holding that mental
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injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress,'26 thus
departing from the common law tort rule in the case of defamation.
In questionable situations under amended section 104(a)(2), practi-
tioners, the Treasury Department, and the Internal Revenue Service may
want to study the common law tort rules with respect to negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Although there are differences (such as in the
case of defamation) between the traditional tort rules and Congress' in-
tent regarding the scope of the exclusion, there are many similarities.
Obviously, if there is no recovery in an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress because the jurisdiction adheres to the physical in-
jury/impact rule of the majority of jurisdictions, there is no tax issue. If
the jurisdiction has abandoned the physical injury/impact rule, then tort
recovery for emotional distress is possible and an issue of taxability
arises. More important, the issue of taxability arises in other tort or tort-
like causes of action for emotional distress, such as in battery and em-
ployment discrimination, where there may be a minimal degree of physi-
cal contact.
I have identified a few questionable areas in the application of
amended section 104(a)(2). For example, in the case of the restaurant
patron who ingests rat feces, there is an issue of whether he suffered a
physical injury or physical sickness. The majority rule in negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress is that the mere ingestion of a toxic sub-
stance is not sufficient physical harm on which to base a claim for dam-
ages for emotional distress.'27 The plaintiff must prove that he suffered
some present physical harm or sickness caused by the toxic substance to
recover damages for emotional distress.'"
In my opinion, it is likely that amended section 104(a)(2) will be
construed against the taxpayer in cases involving emotional distress and
minimal physical contact, in accordance with the general rule of nar-
rowly construing an exclusionary Code provision." Where the majority
tort law with regard to negligent infliction of emotional distress is unfa-
vorable to the restaurant patron (but he recovers in a jurisdiction follow-
ing the minority position), the taxpayer's burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption of taxability may be insurmountable.
Regarding the bodily contact example of unwanted fondling, there
may be a more favorable tax result based on the majority rule in negli-
126. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 310 (1996).
127. See Doyle v. Pillsbury Co., 476 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1985) (denying recovery for sight of
insect in can of peas); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (denying
recovery for exposure to asbestos dust absent proof of actual injury); Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Francis, 245 P.2d 84 (Okla. 1952) (denying recovery for drinking beverage containing
decomposed body of mouse absent proof of physical injury).
128. See supra note 127.
129. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
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gent infliction of emotional distress. The amount of physical contact or
injury that must be shown is minimal.'30 Contact, no matter how slight,
trifling, or trivial, will support a cause of action in tort law.'3 ' The differ-
ence is probably attributable to the fact that, unlike the restaurant patron,
there is direct physical contact between the tortfeasor and the victim of
fondling or similar touching of the human body. For purposes of section
104(a)(2), there must be physical injury or physical sickness.'32 In negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, however, either physical injury or
physical impact will normally suffice under the majority rule.' There-
fore, the Internal Revenue Service may argue that the physical impact
must result in a physical injury or physical sickness-not mere physical
contact.
It remains to be seen if, when, and how the Treasury defines physi-
cal injury or physical sickness in regulations to be issued under section
104(a)(2). Since the Code and legislative history leave many unanswered
questions, it is certain that the issues will be litigated in spite of regula-
tory guidance. For guidance on Congress' intent with respect to the
meaning of physical injury or physical sickness, the Treasury and courts
may want to review the tort law with respect to negligent infliction of
emotional distress
CONCLUSION
For nearly eighty years, taxpayers, their advisors, and the govern-
ment have wrestled with the scope of the personal injury exclusion. This
author believes that the primary cause of the confusion has been the fail-
ure to limit the exclusion to losses of human capital. Once the door was
opened by allowing tax-free treatment for financial losses in the form of
lost wages and earning power, there was no longer any symmetry to the
exclusion. Congress' attempt in 1996 to limit the scope of the exclusion
to physical injury and physical sickness torts has gone a long way to cut
back on the loss of federal revenue. Unfortunately, it does little to bring
symmetry to the personal injury exclusion.
Now victims of defamation, employment discrimination, and other
dignitary torts must pay income taxes on damages received for emotional
distress in practically all cases. This is wrong, since such victims are
merely being made whole for the tortfeasor's conduct in taking away a
130. Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737 (Mass. 1902) (slight blow from being
thrown in automobile); Porter v. Delaware Lockawanna W. R.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust in
eye); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (inhalation of smoke).
131. Zelinski v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1961) ("[A]ny degree of physical impact,
however slight ... ").
132. 42 U.S.C. 104(a)(2) (1996).
133. See supra note 115.
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part of the victim's human capital or birthright.'34 On the other hand, the
victims of physical injury type torts, such as an automobile accident, can
receive lost wages and earning power tax free. Accretions to wealth in
the form of lost wages and earning power are quintessential sources of
income, not reimbursement for human capital losses. These anomalies
appear to be the result of a mistake by Congress in understanding the
appropriate limitations on its power to tax personal injury awards.'35
In my opinion, Code section 104(a)(2) should be amended to read as
follows:
Gross income does not include the amount of compensatory damages,
received by an individual on account of personal injuries, that are at-
tributable to losses to the body, mind, and reputation of such individ-
ual. Such damages shall be excludable whether received by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments.
The birthright concept of the personal injury exclusion is incorpo-
rated in this proposed amendment of section 104(a)(2). Excludable dam-
ages would be limited to human capital losses to the body, mind, and
reputation of the victim of a tort or tort-like claim." By negative impli-
cation, damages for lost wages, earning power, and punitive damages
would always be taxable, regardless of the nature of the tortious cause of
action. I believe that this form of section 104(a)(2) would make much
more sense to taxpayers, their advisors, and the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. It would also avoid the confusion and controversy on what physical
injury or physical sickness really means under current section 104(a)(2).
134. A question arises as to whether taxpayers can successfully argue that Congress lacks the
power to tax as income damages to human capital. Under the rationale of Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), income is defined as accretions to wealth that are clearly realized.
Id. at 476. Has the victim of emotional distress really gained anything when he or she is merely put
back in the position occupied before the tort was committed?
135. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
136. The current Treasury regulations require that a personal injury be attributable to a tort or
tort-like claim. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1997). The regulations define damages received as amounts
received "through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon torts or tort type rights." Id. at
414. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229
(1992) (showing the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of this regulation with respect to requiring tort
or tort-like conduct prior to applying an exclusion).
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